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Frank L. Branson *
I. NEGLIGENCE
A. Duty
A N examination of the duty concept represents the logical starting
Z point for any discussion of negligence case law.1 Several cases in
L this survey deal with the obligations owed tort plaintiffs. Greater
Houston Transportation Co. v. Phillips2 analyzed the duty concept arising
from a motorist's gun shot wounds sustained in an altercation after a motor
vehicle accident. Kurt Phillips was seriously injured when he and a com-
panion were shot by a yellow cab driver after an auto wreck. Yellow Cab
neither instructed its drivers not to carry weapons nor provided any instruc-
tions on the proper procedures to be followed when confrontations arose
from traffic accidents. The cab drivers regularly carried weapons and Yel-
low Cab drivers were known to have carried weapons on at least four sepa-
rate incidents. The jury found that Yellow Cab breached their duty to other
motorists and awarded Phillips more than $3,000,000.00 in damages. The
trial court rendered a take-nothing judgment on the grounds that Yellow
Cab owed no duty to Mr. Phillips. 3 The court of appeals reversed, holding
that Yellow Cab had a duty to attempt to prohibit their drivers from carry-
ing guns.4 The Texas Supreme Court, in turn, reversed the court of appeals,
holding that as a matter of law Yellow Cab was under no duty to control the
actions of its drivers, who were independent contractors.5 A duty to control
an independent contractor arises only upon a showing that the risk of harm
was foreseeable, and that the independent contractor was under the control
of the contractee.6 In Byrd v. Skyline Equipment Co.7 the Austin court of
appeals held that a duty of care created by a service contract extended to an
injured hotel worker.8 Patricia Byrd was injured because of the alleged neg-
ligence of a service company who maintained and repaired washing ma-
* BA Texas Christian University, JD, LL.M, Southern Methodist University, Attorney
at Law, Law Offices of Frank L. Branson, P.C., Dallas, Texas.
1. Kilgarlin & Sterba Boatwright, The Recent Evolution of Duty in Texas, 28 S. TEx. L.J.
241, 245 (1986).
2. 801 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. 1990).
3. Id at 524.
4. Phillips v. McIntyre, 783 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989).
5. Greater Houston, 801 S.W.2d at 527.
6. Id at 525-26.
7. 792 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ).
8. Id. at 197.
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chines at a local hotel. The trial court granted summary judgment against
Byrd.9 The court of appeals reversed, concluding that, as a matter of law,
the service contract incorporated a common law duty to perform tasks "with
care, skill, reasonable expedience and faithfulness." 10 According to the
court, the common law obligation extended to any person who used the
machine, regardless of whether they were a party to the service contract
between the hotel and the equipment company.11 Moreover, the court con-
cluded that summary judgment was improper because the equipment com-
pany could not simply discharge its obligations by retaining an independent
contractor to perform the services.12
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit in Harper v. Agency Rent-A-Car'3 declined
to impose a higher duty on rental car companies. 14 In Harper, a rental car
company offered a ride to two rental customers. During the trip, the rental
company driver collided with another vehicle, and the customers brought
suit for injuries sustained in the wreck. The trial court instructed the jury
that the agency could be found negligent if it failed to use a "high standard
of care,"' 5 a duty typically owed by common carriers. The Fifth Circuit
reversed, holding that the agency, unlike a common carrier, should only
have been held to an ordinary standard of care. 16 Since the rental car com-
pany was not in the business of regularly transporting passengers and did not
charge for carrying the customers, the court found that it was not obligated
to use the same standard of care imposed upon common carriers. 17 The
Fifth Circuit's reasoning stemmed from a Texas Supreme Court case' hold-
ing that school bus operators are only under a duty to act reasonably.' 9
B. Proximate Cause
Proximate cause is the next element to be considered in a negligence case.
In Texas, proximate cause requires that the negligence be both a foreseeable
and a producing cause of the event in question.20 The first case in this sur-
vey to discuss foreseeability is Lofton v. Texas Brine Corp.21 The decision
represents the last in a long line of battles between the supreme court and the
court of appeals on this issue. In Lofton, Andrew Lofton sued the Brine
Corporation and its employees for injuries he received in a collision between
9. Id. at 196.
10. Id. at 197 (quoting Montgomery Ward v. Scharrenbeck, 146 Tex. 153, 204 S.W.2d
508, 510 (1947)).
11. Byrd, 792 S.W.2d at 197.
12. Id.
13. 905 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1990).
14. Id. at 73.
15. Id. at 72.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 73.
18. Mount Pleasant Indep. School Dist. v. Estate of Lindburg, 766 S.W.2d 208, 213 (Tex.
1989).
19. Harper, 905 F.2d at 73.
20. Rudes v. Gottschalk, 159 Tex. 552, 324 S.W.2d 201, 206 (1959); Carey v. Pure Dis-
trib. Corp., 133 Tex. 31, 124 S.W.2d 847, 849 (1939).
21. 777 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. 1989).
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his pickup truck and an 18-wheeler belonging to the Texas Brine Corpora-
tion. After a jury trial, the trial court rendered judgment in Lofton's favor.
The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the evidence was factually
insufficient to support the finding that the rig driver's negligence was a proxi-
mate cause of the accident. 22 The court of appeals reasoned that there was
irrefutable evidence that the pick up truck pulled out in front of the 18-
wheeler less than two seconds before impact.23 The court, therefore, con-
cluded that contributory negligence was the only proximate cause of the oc-
currence in question. 24 The supreme court reversed25 on the grounds that
the lower court failed to apply the proper standard in reviewing the jury's
findings.26 Moreover, the appeals court incorrectly held that the negligent
tractor-trailer driver could not have foreseen the exact sequence of events
which produced the wreck.27 According to the supreme court, the rig
driver's negligence was a proximate cause of the accident if he could have
foreseen the general danger inherent in his conduct, rather than the precise
sequence of events involved.28 The case was remanded to the court of ap-
peals. 29 The case then went to the supreme court a second time and was
again remanded to the court of appeals to apply the proper standard of
review.30
The court in Deerings West Nursing Center v. Scott31 also considered the
foreseeability requirement of the proximate cause analysis. The jury in Deer-
ings found a nursing home negligent and grossly negligent for hiring an unli-
censed nurse who assaulted a visitor in the nursing home.32 The altercation
arose when an eighty-year-old relative of a patient in the nursing home came
to visit early one morning. An unlicensed, thirty-six-year-old male nurse
attempted to prevent her from visiting and a dispute ensued. The jury found
both that the nursing home had breached its duty of exercising reasonable
care in the selection of its medical staff and that the attack was foreseeable.33
Although the nurse had no history of prior physical assaults, the court of
appeals affirmed, reasoning that a nursing home employee charged with
looking after the needs of the elderly should be a person of "sound personal-
ity strengths and not be subject to a proven pattern of impulsive behavior."' 34
The court of appeals pointed to the nurse's fifty-six convictions for theft and
22. Texas Brine Corp. v. Lofton, 698 S.W.2d 691, 692 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1985), reh'g denied, 699 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1985, rev'd sub nor.
Lofton v. Texas Brine Corp. v. Lofton, 720 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. 1986).
23. Lofton, 698 S.W.2d at 694.
24. Id.
25. 720 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. 1986).
26. Id. at 805. The proper standard is annunciated in Aim v. Aluminum Co., 717 S.W.2d
588, 599 (Tex. 1986), and Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).
27. Lofton, 720 S.W.2d at 805.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 751 S.W.2d 197 (rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988), rey'd, 777 S.W.2d 384 (rex.
1989).
31. 787 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, writ denied).
32. Id. at 495.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 496.
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his forged license as proof of foreseeability. 35 The court analogized the nurs-
ing home's negligent hiring to the negligent entrustment of an automobile. 36
The concurring 37 and dissenting opinions 38 shed light on this truly bizarre
fact pattern.
By contrast, the court in Works v. Arlington Memorial Hospital39 found
that a hospital's duties did not extend to foreseeing harm inflicted by pro-
spective adoptive parents. 40 Victor and Lois Works sued Arlington Memo-
rial Hospital alleging that their adopted child had been physically abused
while in the custody of the first set of prospective parents. In granting sum-
mary judgment in favor of the hospital, the trial court concluded that the
hospital could not have foreseen the danger that the child was facing. 41 The
court of appeals affirmed, recognizing that the hospital had no direct contact
with the prospective parents, did not arrange for the initial adoption, and
performed no screening procedures in connection with the first set of unde-
sirable parents.42 As a result, the harm was unforeseeable.4 3
Two notable cases in this survey address the actual cause requirement of
the proximate cause analysis. In re Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport
on August 2, 198544 involved the lawsuit brought against the federal govern-
ment by the survivors of the flight crew of Delta flight 191. Faced with
pending and settled lawsuits of almost $200,000,000.00, the air carrier
sought contribution from the United States government for its share of the
responsibility for the crash. The government responded with claims of con-
tributory negligence on the part of the crew involved. The federal district
court had to decide whether the negligence of the air traffic controllers
and/or the pilots proximately caused the crash of Delta 191 and the subse-
quent loss of 137 passengers, crew, and bystanders. After reviewing the
volumes of evidence presented, the court concluded that the air traffic con-
trollers had been negligent in failing to properly relay weather information
to the crew, but that such negligence was not a proximate cause of the disas-
ter because the flight crew itself possessed substantial weather information
available from government sources.45 According to the evidence, the crew
would have flown into the hazardous weather conditions even if they had
been provided a complete weather picture. The court concluded that since
the flight crew chose to fly into the weather rather than break off the landing
attempt, their negligence was the proximate cause of the crash.46 The car-
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 497 (Fuller, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 500 (Koehler, J., dissenting).
39. 782 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied).
40. Id. at 314.
41. Id.
42. 782 S.W.2d at 313.
43. Id. at 313-314.
44. 720 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Tex. 1989). The litigation is also known as Connors v.
United States.
45. Id. at 1290.
46. Id. For another interesting case, see Transco Leasing Corp. v. United States, 896 F.2d
1435, 1448 (5th Cir. 1990) where the Fifth Circuit held that the air traffic controllers were
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rier was thus solely responsible for the staggering amount of damages
involved.
Yap v. ANR Freight Systems 47 presents another example of how the pro-
ducing cause requirement is applied in the proximate cause analysis. In Yap,
the driver of a pickup truck was seriously injured when a tractor-trailer rig
veered into oncoming traffic to avoid another potential wreck. After a jury
verdict exonerating the truck driver, the court of appeals upheld the jury's
finding that the negligence per se, veering into oncoming traffic, was not a
substantial factor in causing the wreck.48 The court held that an unrelated
driver's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the collision since the
wreck would not have occurred but for the (presumed) negligence of another
car suddenly swerving into the tractor-trailer rig's lane of-traffic. 49
C. Vicarious Liability
Ramos v. Frito-Lay, Inc. 50 was instrumental in developing Texas case law
with respect to the relationship between corporate employers and their man-
agers. The case arose when Jose Padilla, a Frito-Lay District Sales Man-
ager, substituted for one of his vacationing salesmen. Padilla made a routine
stop at a convenience store operated by Salvador Ramos. A dispute arose
between the two men concerning the ownership of a rack displaying Frito-
Lay items, and a shoving incident followed in which the store owner was
injured. A jury determined that the District Manager was guilty of assault
and battery. In addition, the jury concluded that Padilla was not deviating
from Frito-Lay's service when the assault occurred, and assessed exemplary
damages against the corporation. The court of appeals reversed on the
grounds that the employee was not acting in a managerial capacity and thus
solely responsible for the midair collision of two private planes. In contrast to the Delta 191
litigation, the Government's negligence was the only proximate cause of the collision, and the
pilots were cleared of allegations of contributory negligence. Id. at 1448.
47. 789 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ).
48. Id. at 428.
49. Id. The jury was given definitions of unavoidable accident and sudden emergency.
The unavoidable accident instruction seems improper in light of the facts presented. Case law
typically restricts the use of this particular inferential rebuttal issue to instances where the
cause of the occurrence is a nonhuman or nonnegligent physical condition completely unre-
lated to either party. The unrelated physical cause must be completely removed and unaf-
fected by the defendant's negligence. The cases allow such an instruction/definition only when
the event is caused by some condition "not attributable to the parties." Leatherwood Drilling
Co. v. TXL Oil Corp., 379 S.W.2d 693, 697 (rex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Most cases where instructions are given deal with physical conditions or nonnegligent actions
of innocent third parties. See McDonald v. Brennan, 704 S.W.2d 136, 138 (rex. App.-El
Paso 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e) (unforeseen brake failure); Kralik v. Martin, 659 S.W.2d 136, 138
(rex. App.--Corpus Christi 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e) (wet and slick pavement). But see Lemos v.
Montez, 680 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex. 1984) (instruction improper when defendant was negligent
in failing to keep a proper lookout). The proper submission would have been an instruction on
"sole proximate cause", typically submitted when a nonparty's conduct is the only cause of the
occurrence. Jackson v. Fontaine's Clinics, 499 S.W.2d 87, 89-90 (rex. 1973); Herrera v.
Balmorhea Feeders, Inc., 539 S.W.2d 84, 87-88 (rex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
50. 784 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990).
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the corporation was immune from exemplary damages. 51 The court of ap-
peals focused on the character of the employee's act to determine whether it
was managerial or nonmanagerial. 52 The supreme court rejected this formu-
lation, and declared that the appropriate test was whether the manager was
acting within the scope of his employment when the conduct occurred.5 3
Under the supreme court's opinion in King v. McGuff,5 4 the test was
whether the manager was acting in the course and scope of his employment.
Under Ramos, a corporate master is liable for exemplary damages imposed
due to the conduct of its managers.55 The purpose of this test is to deter the
selection of "unfit persons for important positions", 56 and such test is consis-
tent with the policy annunciated in the Restatement Second of Torts.57 To
hold otherwise would allow an employer "to escape liability for the outra-
geous acts of its management-level employee [merely] because the employee
was performing a non-managerial task."58 The opinion is well-reasoned, and
seems consistent with existing Texas case law.59
A number of cases in this survey period develop the relationship between
general contractors and supposedly independent subcontractors. Enserch
Corp. v. Parker60 involved a wrongful death action brought against a pipeline
for the asphyxiation of two workers employed by a pipeline service com-
pany. One of the issues on appeal was whether the service company was
truly an independent contractor. The issue turned on the supreme court's
interpretation of Redinger v. Living, Inc. 61 As a general rule, the owner and
occupier of a premises does not have a duty to see that independent contrac-
tors perform their work in a safe manner.62 An exception created in Redin-
ger, however, imposes liability when the general contractor "retains the
control of any part of the work."'63 The contract in Enserch gave the pipe-
line operator the right to "order work changes in the nature of additions,
deletions or modifications."" The operator provided a book to employees
outlining the procedures to be followed and frequently sent inspectors to
supervise the work performed by the supposedly independent contractors.
The supreme court held that this evidence created fact issues concerning
51. Id. at 668.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 669.
54. 149 Tex. 432, 435, 234 S.W.2d 403, 405 (1950).
55. Ramos, 784 S.W.2d at 669.
56. Id.
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 comment b (1979).
58. Ramos, 784 S.W.2d at 669.
59. Purvis v. Prattco, Inc., 595 S.W.2d 103, 104 (Tex. 1980); Fisher v. Carrousel Motor
Hotel, 424 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. 1967).
60. 794 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. 1990).
61. 689 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1985). In Exxon v. Quinn, 726 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Tex. 1987), the
supreme court developed the exceptions further by imposing liability on a leaseholder who
failed to provide a reasonably safe place for independent contractors to work. The case is
discussed in Branson, Personal Torts, 42 Sw. L.J. 139, 142 (1988).
62. Abalos v. Oil Dev. Co., 544 S.W.2d 627, 631 (Tex. 1976).
63. Redinger, 689 S.W.2d at 418 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414
(1977).
64. Enserch, 794 S.W.2d at 6.
[Vol. 45
PERSONAL TORTS
whether the operator's rights to exercise control fell within the Redinger
exception.65
Similar cases applying the Redinger exception include Lawson-Avila Con-
struction v. Stoutamire,66 Edco Production, Ina v. Hernandez67 and Sherard
v. Smith.68 The issue in each case involved whether the general contractors
retained enough control over the subcontractors to create liability under the
Redinger exception. Following Redinger and the Restatement69 view, the
Lawson-Avila court concluded that the general contractor retained control
by virtue of the terms of the contract and the right to enforce safety require-
ments.70 Likewise, the court in Edco Production imposed liability on the
operator of an oil lease whose employee actually supervised and gave advice
concerning the safety of welding operations.71 The Sherard court upheld the
summary judgment granted in favor of a farmer who employed an independ-
ent truck driver who was later involved in a fatal collision.72 Evidence at
trial revealed that the farmer did not retain sufficient control over the driver,
the driver was paid a specific price for the amount of grain hauled, the
farmer did not withhold any portion of the payment for taxes or benefits,
and the farmer provided no fuel instructions for doing the job. As such, the
court concluded that the relationship between the farmer and the driver was
clearly one of independent contractor-owner, and therefore, no liability was
imposed. 73
Of historical importance is the possible termination of some of the most
complicated litigation in recent Texas history. Scurlock Oil Co. v.
Smithwick 74 is the fourth reported appellate opinion arising from a
van/trailer truck collision which killed George Smithwick and Clay Dove
(both Missouri Pacific Railroad Company workers). 75 Punitive damages
were assessed against the oil company which owned the tractor-trailer in-
volved.' 6 The oil company attempted to escape liability on the ground that
it did not ratify or approve its driver's conduct. The court of appeals held
that regardless of ratification or adoption of the acts, there was evidence that
the oil company itself was negligent by failing to properly supervise and train
the driver.77 The court noted that the oil company paid its drivers based
upon the number of loads hauled and the number of miles driven.' 8 This
65. Id.
66. 791 S.W.2d 584, 588 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied).
67. 794 S.W.2d 69, 73 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied).
68. 778 S.W.2d 546, 549 (rex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied).
69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (1965).
70. Lawson-Avila, 791 S.W.2d at 591.
71. Edco Production, 794 S.W.2d at 74, 76.
72. Sherard, 778 S.W.2d at 547.
73. Id. at 549.
74. 787 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
75. See Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 701 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1985),
rev'd, 724 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1986); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Huebner, 704 S.W.2d 353 (Tex.
App.--Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
76. Scurlock, 787 S.W.2d at 561.




practice encouraged truck drivers to maximize the number of trips and miles
driven at the expense of safety. According to the court, direct corporate
gross negligence subjects an employer to exemplary damages, regardless of
vicarious liability principles. 79
D. Premises Liability
In Reyna v. Ayco Development Corp. 80 a three-year-old was injured when
she wandered into an unlocked open electrical switching cabinet. Although
the cabinet was located on the grounds of the Coronado Apartments (man-
aged by Ayco Development Corp.), it was entirely within the City of Aus-
tin's easement in the complex. The City of Austin was initially a defendant
in the case but settled with the parents of the injured girl. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the apartment owners on the ground
that the owners had no duty to the plaintiff since the granting of the ease-
ment gave the city exclusive right to construct, operate, repair and maintain
the electrical systems contained within the easement81 . The court of appeals
affirmed the summary judgment, concluding that the easement extinguished
the apartment owner's duty.8 2 This decision is consistent with general ease-
ment law, holding that serving owners have no duties to third parties upon
the premises.83 Additionally, the Reyna case is consistent with the holding
in Bryan v. Dockery. 84 In Bryan, a postman was injured when stairs leading
to a rental unit collapsed on him. Suit was filed against both the property
owner and the lessor. After a jury award, the property owners appealed
arguing they owed no duty to the postal employee. The court of appeals
upheld the jury verdict on the ground that landlords had the responsibility
to keep leased premises in repair.8 5 Relying upon supreme court precedent 6
and a prior course of dealing between the landlord and tenant, the court held
that the property owner had a duty to third parties to keep the premises in
good repair.8 7
The appellants in Bryan also alleged errors in the trial court's submission
of the case to the jury. The landlord requested issues concerning the tenant's
right to require repair of defects, the tenant's possession of the leased prem-
ises, the condition of the stairs, and the landlord's attempts to make repairs.
The court of appeals upheld the trial court's decision not to submit these
issues because the right to repair and the condition of the steps prior to
injury were irrelevant to the ultimate question of the landlord's negligence. 8
The tendered issue regarding the landlord's diligence in making repairs was
79. Id.
80. 788 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ denied).
81. Id. at 723-24.
82. Id. at 724.
83. Id. The court of appeals relied on West v. Giesen, 242 S.W. 312, 320-21 (Tex. Civ.
App.-1922, writ ref'd).
84. 788 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1990, no writ).
85. Id. at 450.
86. Yarbrough v. Booher, 141 Tex. 420, 422, 174 S.W.2d 47, 48 (1943).
87. Bryan, 788 S.W.2d at 450.
88. Id. at 452.
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properly rejected since it was an inferential rebuttal issue forbidden by the
rules of procedure. s9 Under the new rules concerning issue submission,9°
trial courts are prohibited from submitting separate questions relating to de-
fensive theories which negate a plaintiff's cause of action.
Sanchez v. Excelo Building Maintenance9" also involved proper jury is-
sues. Sanchez was a slip-and-fall case in which the trial court submitted two
jury questions encompassing the four elements required by substantive
law. 92 The injured party complained on appeal that all four liability ele-
ments should have been combined into one question instead of a "two-ques-
tion cluster." 93 While recognizing that the rules of procedure require
submission of broad questions whenever feasible,94 the court of appeals held
that the trial court had some discretion in submitting "two reasonably broad
liability questions instead of one."95
In Montelongo v. Goodal196 a tenant tripped and fell on defective trailer
house steps and sued the landlord to recover for the injuries sustained. The
trial court granted the landlord's directed verdict motion. The court of ap-
peals affirmed on the basis that the tenant had exclusive rights to possession
and control of the premises and that the defects were not known to the land-
lord.97 The court noted that landlords who transfer possession of premises
to tenants generally owe no obligation to exercise ordinary care unless the
landlord has knowledge of hidden defects which he fails to disclose.' 8 In the
absence of any evidence either that the contract created a duty to repair or
that the landlord knew of the hidden defects, the appeals court concluded
that the directed verdict absolving the landlord was proper. 9
A similar case, Flint v. Mickelsen,100 confirmed that in order to recover, a
licensee must show either that her injuries were the result of the premises
owner's willful, wanton conduct (or gross negligence), or that the premises
owner had actual knowledge of a dangerous condition which was unknown
to the licensee.101 Because the licensee did not request issues inquiring into
the landlord's willful, wanton or grossly negligent conduct, she could re-
89. Id.
90. TEx. R. Civ. P. 277.
91. 780 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, no writ).
92. In most slip-and-fall cases, the plaintiff must show that a condition of the premises
posed an unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiff, that the defendant lad actual or construc-
tive knowledge of the condition of the premises, that the defendant did not exercise reasonable
care to reduce or eliminate the risk, and that the defendant's failure to do so was a proximate
cause of the injuries. Corbin v. Safeway Stores, 648 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Tex. 1983); see also City
of Denton v. Van Page, 701 S.W.2d 831, 834 (Tex. 1986).
93. Sanchez, 780 S.W.2d at 853.
94. TEx. R. Civ. P. 277. See Kilgarlin, Quesada & Russell, Practicing Law in the "New
Age" The 1988 Amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 19 T.x. TECH. L. REv.
881, 912 (1988).
95. Sanchez, 780 S.W.2d at 854.
96. 788 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, no writ).
97. Id. at 719.
98. Id. at 718.
99. Id. at 720.
100. 781 S.W.2d 409 (rex. App. - Houston [Ist Dist.] 1989, no writ).
101. Id. at 410-11.
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cover only if the jury had found that she was ignorant of the existence of a
dangerous condition known to the premises owner.10 2
II. PRODUCTS LIABILITY DEFENSES
Aluminum Company of America v. Aim 10 3 was the culmination of a long
series of appeals arising from a trial of an exploding bottle cap case. Alumi-
num Company of America (Alcoa) developed a system for applying alumi-
num caps to carbonated soft drink bottles. The owner of a Houston 7-Up
Bottling Company, J. F. W. Enterprises, Inc., purchased one of Alcoa's cap-
ping machines and used it to apply the Alcoa-designed caps to soft drink
bottles. The capping material was purchased from an independent manufac-
turer that produced the Alcoa-designed caps. In 1976, a J. F. W. applied
cap blew off of a thirty-two ounce bottle of 7-Up and blinded James Alm. A
previous supreme court opinion had already clarified that Alcoa, as the de-
signer and marketer of the closure process, cap, and capping machine, had a
duty to warn consumers of the hazards of bottle-cap explosions. 104
The most recent supreme court case was appealed after the remand to
consider evidence of Alcoa's warnings. Alcoa maintained that the local 7-
Up bottler was an "appropriate intermediary through which Alcoa could
have fulfilled its duty to warn the ultimate consumer."' 05 Alcoa further con-
tended that the evidence showed they had discharged their duty by passing
adequate warning to the intermediary who supplied the bottle. The supreme
court rejected Alcoa's argument since there was no evidence that 7-Up had
anything to do with the closure system which Alcoa sold to the local bot-
tler.106 7-Up was not in the chain of distribution of the bottles or bottle caps
themselves. 7-Up merely licensed J. F. W. to bottle the soft drink and did
not exercise control over the method or materials used to cap the bottles.
Under these circumstances, the supreme court concluded that 7-Up was not
a learned intermediary through which Alcoa's duty could be discharged. 107
The supreme court's treatment of the exemplary damages assessed against
Alcoa was another controversy in the Alm opinion. After remand from Aim
I, the court of appeals held that there was insufficient evidence supporting
the jury's finding.108 The supreme court affirmed the jury's finding on the
ground that there was "no evidence in the record to negate" the jury's find-
ing of gross negligence.' 0 9 A four-judge dissent would have remanded the
Alm I gross negligence findings to the trial court for further development.110
In the dissent's view, the supreme court inappropriately declared Alcoa
102. Id. at 411.
103. 785 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1990).
104. Alm v. Aluminum Co. of America, 717 S.W.2d 588, 595 (Tex. 1986) [hereinafter AimI].
105. Aim, 785 S.W.2d at 139.
106. Id. at 140.
107. Id.
108. 753 S.W.2d at 478.
109. 785 S.W.2d at 140.
110. Id. at 141.
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guilty of gross negligence as a matter of law and thus denied the company a
right to a jury trial on that issue. I II
At first blush, the dissent seems to be correct. A close reading of the Aim
opinion and an understanding of the context out of which it arose helps
explain the true nature of the court's holding. The Aim opinions are the
latest skirmish in a long-running battle between the supreme court and the
court of appeals over the appropriate standard to be used in reviewing a jury
finding. Recall that an 1891 amendment to the Texas Constitution granted
the court of appeals the final say on questions of fact. 112 In theory, the courts
of appeal have the exclusive right to review jury findings to determine
whether factually sufficient evidence exists to support them. On the other
hand, the Texas Bill of Rights and Rules of Civil Procedure guarantee both
that the right to trial by jury shall be protected and that the jury is the sole
judge of the credibility of witnesses.1 13 Thus, a potential conflict between
the constitutional provisions exists,114 since the courts of appeal are often
said to be substituting their opinions for the jury's findings.'"5 The supreme
court attempted to correct the situation by enunciating a clearer, more prag-
matic standard for the courts of appeal to follow when reviewing the factual
sufficiency of evidence.' 16 The standard announced in Herbert v. Herbert 117
and Pool v. Ford Motor Company118 requires courts of appeal to clearly set
forth what evidence did and did not support the jury's finding. Understand-
ably, there was much resistance to the supreme court's new standard, and
the Aim opinions were ripe for the development of this newly enunciated
standard. The Aim II opinion is best understood as an example of the
supreme court's deference to jury findings in hotly disputed cases rather than
its usurpation of a court of appeals' ability to review jury findings. It is also
important to note that the supreme court did not determine Alcoa to be
grossly negligent as a matter of law, but merely held that there was legally
insufficient evidence to negate the jury's finding of gross negligence.' 19
Another defense to products liability cases in Texas is that there was an
unforeseeable alteration of a product after its introduction into the stream of
commerce.120 The policy behind strict product liability applies only when a
product is expected to and does reach the consumer without a substantial
change in the condition in which it was sold. 12' The defense effectively im-
munizes a manufacturer from liability when the product undergoes an un-
111. Id. at 142.
112. TEx. CONST. art. V, § 6.
113. Tax. CONST. art. I, § 15; art. V, § 10; TEX. R. Civ. P. 226a.
114. Dyson v. Olin Corp., 692 S.W.2d 456, 458 (rex. 1985) (Robertson, J., concurring).
115. See Lofton v. Texas Brine Corp., 777 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Tex. 1989).
116. 717 S.W.2d at 594-95.
117. 754 S.W.2d 141, 143 (rex. 1988).
118. 715 S.W.2d 629, 634 (rex. 1986); see also Cropper v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 754
S.W.2d 646, 648 (rex. 1988).
119. "There is no evidence in the record to negate the jury's finding of gross negligence."
Aim II, 785 S.W.2d at 140.
120. Woods v. Crane Carrier Co., 693 S.W.2d 377, 380 (Tex. 1985).
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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foreseeable change or alteration. 122 Ramirez v. Volkswagen of America 123
was a wrongful death case arising from a fiery collision involving a Volk-
swagen van. The plaintiffs contended that the fuel-fed fire was a result of a
design defect. Volkswagen defended on the grounds that there had been a
substantial and unforeseeable change to the configuration of the van because
the driver had removed the middle seat and replaced it with a large wooden
box. According to the testimony, the wooden box hampered the crash con-
trol system and made the van uncrashworthy. The court of appeals agreed
that a jury instruction on subsequent modification was proper in light of the
uncontroverted evidence.124
The effect of governmental regulations was the subject of two other opin-
ions during this survey period. Lorenz v. Celotex Corp. 125 was a Fifth Cir-
cuit case in which the jury was instructed that the asbestos manufacturer's
compliance with government safety standards was strong and substantial ev-
idence that the product was not defective. The substance of the instruction
came from prior federal opinions' 26 and was held to be a correct statement
of the general rule of law. 127
The federal district court case, Dallas v. General Motors Corporation,'28
dealt with federal preemption of state product liability claims. The plaintiffs
alleged that a 1980 Oldsmobile Omega was defectively designed because it
did not include a passive restraint system (airbag). General Motors claimed,
and the court agreed, that the Federal Safety Act 29 and the Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard 130 gave the manufacturer the option of installing
manual seat belts instead of automatic airbags. The state design defect
claims were thus implicitly preempted by the corresponding federal law. 31
Much of the confusion concerning defenses to product liability claims
arises when a case is tried on competing theories, such as products liability
and common law negligence. Garcia v. Dependable Shell Core Machines13 2
was a case which arose from injuries a worker received while cleaning a sand
mixer. The injured worker received a take-nothing judgment on his twin
theories of marketing defect and common law negligence. In response to one
question, the jury determined that the manufacturer failed to give adequate
warnings and instructions for use with the sand mixer but failed to find that
this marketing defect made the product unreasonably dangerous. 33 In re-
sponse to a later question, the jury refused to find that the failure to give
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment g (1965).
123. 788 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).
124. Id. at 702. Apparently, the plaintiffs were prohibited from introducing testimony
from certain expert witnesses as a sanction related to the discovery process. Id. at 703.
125. 896 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1990).
126. Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129, 1144 (5th Cir. 1985); Dartez v.
Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 471 (5th Cir. 1985).
127. Lorenz, 896 F.2d at 150.
128. 725 F. Supp. 902 (W.D. Tex 1989).
129. 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) (1988).
130. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, § 4.2.2 (1989).
131. Dallas, 725 F. Supp. at 906.
132. 783 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1989, no writ).
133. Id. at 248.
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adequate warning was negligent. 134 Since the questions involved different
theories of liability, there was no irreconcilable conflict between the answers,
and the take-nothing verdict was upheld.13 5
Several cases decided in this survey period discussed the sufficiency of evi-
dence of various product failures and defenses to such failures. In Smith v.
Technibilt, Ina 136 the court held that there was insufficient evidence to con-
clude that a grocery cart was defectively designed when it allegedly caused a
shopper to trip.137 The court in Rodriguez v. Universal Fastenings Corp. 138
upheld the jury's failure to find a series of bolts used in a construction sup-
port system defective. 139 The court in Roberts v. Harnischfeger Corp. 140 up-
held a decision under the Federal Rules of Evidence to exclude certain post-
accident design changes as irrelevant to the issue of reasonableness of the
design at the time of manufacture. 14' Finally, the court in King v. Arm-
strong World Industries142 upheld a jury's finding of causation in a suit'for
injuries sustained as a result of asbestos exposure. 143
III. PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE
A. Medical Malpractice
One group of cases included in this survey period concerned a patient's
right to make informed decisions about medical intervention. In 1977, the
legislature enacted a statute creating the Texas Medical Disclosure Panel.'"
The panel established minimum levels of disclosure that physicians and
other health care providers are required to make to their patients 45 regard-
ing certain surgical and medical procedures. Depending on which category
a specific procedure falls into, certain disclosures may or may not be re-
quired. 146 If the health care provider complies with the statute by providing
the required disclosure, the consent form is rebuttal evidence of the dis-
charge of the duty to warn. 147
Jones v. Papp 148 involved whether a cardiologist had made a proper dis-
closure of both the risks of allergic reactions to certain dyes and of post-
surgical bleeding. Although there was some variance between the risks dis-
closed and the actual injuries suffered, the court held that the physician
134. Id.
135. Id. at 250.
136. 791 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, no writ).
137. Id. at 249.
138. 777 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no writ).
139. Id. at 517.
140. 901 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1989).
141. Id. at 44.
142. 906 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1990).
143. Id. at 1027.
144. Thx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i § 6.03 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1991).
145. Id. § 6.03 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1991).
146. Id. § 6.05 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1991).
147. Id. § 6.07 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1991).
148. 782 S.W.2d 236 (rex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied).
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abided by his duty to disclose the risks inherent in the procedures.t 49 Evans
v. Conleey 150 involved the disclosure of risks accompanying reconstructive
breast surgery. The court of appeals concluded that summary judgment
granted in favor of the physician was improper because there was no evi-
dence indicating that the physician had informed the patient of the risks
involved in the surgical procedures.1 5 1 The court in Ritter v. Delaney'12
clarified that only the operating physician need obtain the required informed
consent.' 5 3 In Ritter, the patient alleged that the hospital and attending
physician failed to obtain informed consent before she underwent a compli-
cated procedure. Claims were made against both the hospital and the inter-
nist who apprised the patient of the alternatives to surgery and the
complications of the procedure. The court of appeals examined one section
of the disclosure act and determined that only the treating physician had a
duty to make the required disclosure.'5 4 According to the court of appeals,
hospitals and other attending physicians are not required to make any dis-
closure or to obtain consent.1'5
Summary judgments granted in favor of physicians are frequently encoun-
tered on appeal. Typically summary judgment is granted on the basis that
the physician's conduct was not negligent and was not a proximate cause of
the patient's injuries. Summary judgment in such an instance is appropriate
only when there are no genuine issues of material fact concerning the physi-
cian's alleged negligence. 15 6 In order to maintain such a burden, the physi-
cian must establish by affidavit or other competent evidence, the standard of
care used and prove that the conduct complained of was not a breach of such
standard. Elam v. Yale Clinic, 1 7 Knapp v. Eppright,5 8 and Connor v. Wal-
trip 159 are examples of effective presentation of this basic procedural tool. In
each case, competent summary judgment proof established the appropriate
standard of care and showed that the defendant did not deviate from the
standard.160 On the other hand, the summary judgments granted in Trevino
v. Houston Orthopedic Center 161 and White v. Wah 162 were reversed because
the affiants failed to establish the appropriate standard of care. 16 3
In Wisenbarger v. Gonzales Warm Springs Rehabilitation Hospital 164 an
149. Id. at 241,
150. 787 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).
151. Id. at 572.
152. 790 S.W.2d 29 (rex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied).
153. Id at 31.
154. Id. The court's decision turned on an analysis of TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
4590i § 6.02 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
155. Ritter, 790 S.W.2d at 31.
156. Id. at 32. The court held that the patient did not sufficiently raise a fact issue as to
whether the physician was acting as agent for the hospital. Id.
157. 783 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ).
158. 783 S.W.2d 293 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ).
159. 791 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. App.-Dalas 1990, no writ).
160. 791 S.W.2d at 540; 783 S.W.2d at 642; 783 S.W.2d at 296.
161. 782 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. App.-:-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no writ).
162. 789 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ).
163. 789 S.W.2d at 316; 782 S.W.2d at 517.
164. 789 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
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injured patient brought suit against a hospital for negligence and violations
of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA). 165 The patient devel-
oped a decubitus ulcer which progressed to the point that it exposed his
spinal cord. He argued that the hospital breached an implied warranty of
services with relation to the health care provided. Holding that the Medical
Liability and Insurance Improvement Act 166 precluded DTPA based claims
against health care providers, the court of appeals upheld a partial summary
judgment rendered in favor of the hospital.167 On its face, the court of ap-
peals' opinion seems correct. In spite of the expansion of warranty-based
liability in other areas, 168 health care providers are shielded from liability for
breaches of implied warranty concerning certain improper treatment. 169
What the court of appeals did not address was whether a health care pro-
vider could be subject to liability based upon misrepresentation, an uncon-
scionable act, or breach of an express warranty. 1 0 Since DTPA claims
should be based upon statutory violations, negligence and implied warranties
are not necessary to this special claim. 71 In at least one supreme court case,
Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hospital,"72 the court allowed recovery
under the DTPA for various misrepresentations made by the hospital
involved. 173
At least three cases during this survey period addressed the statute of limi-
tations in medical negligence cases. Generally, the statute of limitations for
medical negligence cases in Texas is two years from the date of the treatment
in question.174 According to a recent supreme court opinion,"75 whenever a
specific ascertainable deviation from the standard of care occurs, the two-
year statute is absolute (subject only to a special 75-day tolling provision). 176
In Wilson v. Braeuer177 the court of appeals held that the injury sustained
from an alleged case of surgical negligence occurred on an ascertainable pre-
cise date and that the statute of limitations began to run from the date of
surgery. 178 Furthermore, the court concluded that retrospective application
of the supreme court's decision in Kimball v. Brothers 179 was not an ex post
165. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.565 (Vernon 1987 and Supp. 1990).
166. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 12.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
167. 688 S.W.2d at 691.
168. Archibald v. Act III Arabians, 755 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Tex. 1988); Melody Home Mfg.
Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 354 (Tex. 1987).
169. Dennis v. Allison, 698 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. 1985).
170. Wisenbarger, 789 S.W. 70 at 690.
171. D. BRAGO, P. MAXWELL, AND J. LONGLEY, TEXAS CONSUMER LMGATION (2nd
ed. 1983); Alderman, The Deceptive Trade Practices Act Meets the Medical Malpractice Act, 14
CAVEAT VENDOR 33 (1989); see also Gold & Quesada, Personal Injury Actions Under the
DTPA, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 711, 717-18 (1990).
172. 747 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. 1987).
173. Id. at 368.
174. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
175. Kimball v. Brothers, 741 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. 1987).
176. Id. at 372.
177. 788 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
178. Id. at 188.




Two other cases have stressed that the two-year statute of limitations is
subject to a modified discovery rule. The court in Gatling v. Perna'81 re-
versed a summary judgment which had been granted on the ground that
more than two years had elapsed between the date of the alleged negligence
and the date that suit was filed.18 2 The lawsuit alleged that a psychiatrist's
treatment of Jean Gatling had caused her a painful neuromuscular condition
known as tardive dyskinesia. Although the patient learned of her diagnosis
more than two years before filing the suit, she did not learn until after the
limitation period had expired that the powerful drugs prescribed by the psy-
chiatrist could have caused the condition. Since the statute of limitations
cannot begin to run until the claimant discovers both an injury and its
cause, 18 3 the court concluded that the limitations period had not run before
suit was filed. 18 4 Likewise, the court in Stotter v. Wingo 1 15 reversed a grant-
ing of summary judgment because the patient had raised genuine fact issues
concerning the date that he learned of his dentist's negligence.186 The court
concluded that rigid application of the two-year statute of limitations would
have been unconstitutional because Mr. Stotter did not have a reasonable
opportunity to discover the negligence before the statute of limitations
ran. 187
In Haddock v. Arnspiger 188 the plaintiff suffered a perforated colon while
undergoing a routine proctological examination. The plaintiff relied upon
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, contending both that his injury would not
ordinarily have occurred without negligence and that the defendant's physi-
cian had sole control of the instrumentality that caused his injury. After a
jury trial, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the physician on the
negligence claims.
The supreme court ultimately concluded that the doctrine of res ipsa lo-
quitur did not apply in this particular medical negligence case.189 Section
7.01 of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act190 limits the
use of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to those cases in which it had been
applied prior to the effective date of the act.191 Some courts use this eviden-
180. Wilson, 788 S.W.2d at 188.
181. 788 S.W.2d 44 (rex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
182. Id. at 47.
183. The court cited to Corder v. A. H. Robins Co., 692 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex. App.-
Eastland 1985, no writ).
184. Galling, 788 S.W.2d at 47. Plaintiff also contended that the physician had fraudu-
lently concealed the existence of a cause of action and that the statute was thus tolled under
Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907, 908 (rex. 1983). Galling, 788 S.W.2d at 47-48.
185. 794 S.W.2d 50 (rex. App.-San Antonio 1990, no writ).
186. Id. at 54.
187. Id.
188. 793 S.W.2d 948 (rex. 1990).
189. Id. at 954.
190. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 7.01 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
191. The statute provides: "The common law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur shall only apply
to health care liability claims against health care providers or physicians in those cases to
which it has been applied by the appellate courts of this state as of the effective date of this
subchapter." Id. § 7.01 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
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tiary rule in medical negligence cases when the nature of the alleged mal-
practice and injuries are plainly within the common knowledge of laymen.
Such instances include operating on the wrong portion of the body, negli-
gence in the use of mechanical instruments, and leaving surgical instruments
and sponges within the body. 192 In Haddock the court concluded that the
use of a colonoscope was not a matter within the common knowledge of
laymen. 193 A four-judge dissent argued that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
should apply in this case. 194 Written by Justice Doggett, the dissent con-
vincingly argued that established precedent allowed the use of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine in precisely this sort of case. 95 Although the dissent cited
at least five other cases where the doctrine had been allowed prior to the
enactment of Article 4590i,196 the majority nevertheless overruled this
precedent. 197
Likewise, the court in Wendenburg v. Williams 19 declined to allow appli-
cation of the. doctrine of res ipsa loquitur where a physician allegedly oper-
ated on the wrong part of the body. 199 As mentioned earlier, the use of the
evidentiary rule is generally allowed in medical negligence cases involving
operations on the wrong portion of the body.2° ° In this case, the plaintiffs
alleged that the wrong part of the body had been affected when the physician
perforated the iliac artery and the iliac vein while performing a lumbar
laminectomy. While the physician certainly did not intend to puncture the
artery and vein, both vessels touched the anterior ligament of the disc where
the surgery was performed. The court concluded that any injury to the ves-
sels was a mistake and this was not a case of operating on the wrong part of
the body.20' The court further held that use of the specialized tools neces-
sary to perform a laminectomy did not qualify as the misuse of a tool within
the common knowledge of laymen.202
The type of evidence admissible in a medical negligence case was dis-
cussed in Metot v. Danielson.20 3 In Metot the court held that it was error to
exclude testimony offered by a board certified medical toxicologist to estab-
lish the standard of care common to all areas of medical practice.0 4 Ac-
cording to the court, the fact that the defendant's physician was a
neurosurgeon did not mandate exclusion of the toxicologist's testimony.
Under the old rule, a practitioner of one school of medicine was not compe-
192. See Martin v. Petta, 694 S.W.2d 233, 239 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Williford v. Banowsky, 563 S.W.2d 702, 705 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1978, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
193. Haddock, 793 S.W.2d at 951.
194. Id. at 955 (Doggett J., dissenting).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 954.
198. 784 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).




203. 780 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1989, writ denied).
204. Id. at 287.
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tent to testify as an expert in a medical negligence case involving a practi-
tioner of another school of medicine.20 5 A recognized exception to this,
however, occurs when the particular subject under scrutiny is "common to
and equally recognized and developed in all fields of practice. ' 20 6 The ex-
ception to the "same school" rule should have allowed the toxicologist to
testify concerning the proper standard of care in relation to prescription
medicine. 207 In addition, the court of appeals held that the patient could
properly elicit testimony from the expert witness concerning the ultimate
issues of negligence and proximate cause. 208 Under the Rules of Evi-
dence,20 9 experts in medical malpractice cases are allowed to give their opin-
ions on ultimate issues and may testify that certain conduct is, or is not,
negligent, grossly negligent or the proximate cause of an occurrence. 210
Two other cases also warrant discussion. The court in Hernandez v. Nue-
ces County Medical Society Community Blood Bank 211 reversed a summary
judgment motion granted in favor of a blood bank. 212 The trial court had
concluded that no fact issues existed concerning the blood bank's negligence
in light of evidence that the facility complied with federal and other mini-
mum standards promulgated by various licensing agencies in connection
with the testing of stored blood for certain types of hepatitis. While the
court of appeals noted that compliance with regulation standards and licens-
ing requirements are some evidence of nonnegligence, the court also recog-
nized that compliance does not conclusively establish that the health care
provider met its duty and was not negligent.213 Watson v. Isern214 was an
appeal from a medical negligence case in Beaumont. The court of appeals in
Watson ruled admissible testimony that the defendant's expert allowed de-
fendant to treat the expert's family and that the expert had a long standing
relationship with the defense attorney. 215 The excluded evidence, however,
would have established that the expert witness was a defendant in four or
five other medical malpractice lawsuits.216
B. Attorney Malpractice
The supreme court in Millhouse v. Wiesenthal 217 was presented with a
205. Hart v. Van Zandt, 399 S.W.2d 791, 797 (Tex. 1965).
206. Porter v. Puryear, 153 Tex. 82, 262 S.W.2d 933, 936 (1953), rev'd, 264 S.W.2d 689(Tex. 1954).
207. Metot, 780 S.W.2d at 287.
208. Id. at 288.
209. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 704.
210. 780 S.W.2d at 288; see also Birchileld v. Texarkana Memorial Hosp., 747 S.W.2d 361,
365 (Tex. 1987).
211. 779 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, no writ).
212. Id. at 872.
213. Id. at 871.
214. 782 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, writ denied).
215. Id. at 551.
216. Id. at 550. It is interesting to note that during the pendency of the appeal, the trialjudge was elevated to the Chief Justice of the court of appeals. He concurred in the decision to
reverse himself. Id. at 556. (Walker, C.J., concurring).
217. 775 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. 1989).
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claim of attorney malpractice arising from a failure to timely file certain
appellate documents. The plaintiff, himself an attorney, brought suit against
one of his former lawyers for negligently failing to file a statement of facts
necessary for an appeal. In an unpublished opinion, the appellate court in
the underlying lawsuit affirmed the judgment against Millhouse allegedly on
the grounds that the statement of facts was not timely filed.
The defendant's lawyer filed a motion for summary judgment on the
grounds that his failure to file a statement of facts was not a proximate cause
of the damages sustained. The court of appeals and the supreme court
agreed that the proximate cause question in an attorney malpractice case is a
question of law for the court and is not to be determined by the jury.218 The
majority reasoned both that appellate practice is too complicated for a jury
to understand and that judges are in the best position to make this type of
determination. 219 The supreme court declared that only another court is
qualified to determine the merits and probable outcome of an allegedly mis-
handled appeal.220 A three-judge dissent argued that the determination of
proximate cause in cases of attorney negligence are no more complicated or
difficult than other fields of professional negligence, such as medicine, con-
struction and engineering. 221
In Simpson v. James222 the Fifth Circuit, applying Texas law, concluded
that the two-year statute of limitations for legal negligence actions does not
begin to run until the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care
should have discovered, the nature and cause of the injury.223 Relying upon
Willis v. Maverick,224 the court found sufficient evidence to support the
jury's finding that the injured client did not know, and should not have
known, of the alleged negligence more than two years before filing suit.225
IV. IMMUNMES
A. Texas Tort Claims Act
Three cases decided in this survey period dealt with special defects under
the Texas Tort Claims Act. 226 As a general rule, a governmental entity owes
third parties "only the duty that a private person owes to a licensee on pri-
vate property." 227 Typically this is construed to exonerate the government
from liability unless it is shown that the governmental entity knew of the
presence of a hidden defect and neither warned the licensee nor made the
218. Id. at 627-28.
219. Id. at 626.
220. Id. at 628.
221. Id. (Mauzy, J., dissenting).
222. 903 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1990).
223. Id. at 375.
224. 760 S.W.2d 642, 644 (rex. 1988). For a discussion of this opinion, see Branson, Per-
sonal Torts, 42 SW. L.J. 139, 165 (1988).
225. 903 F.2d at 376.
226. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1991).
227. Id. § 101.022 (Vernon 1986).
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conditions safe.228 Such a restricted duty does not apply, however, in in-
stances of special defects. Such defects create a special duty to warn on the
part of the governmental units.229 As such, the question of what is or is not
a special defect is typically an area of much debate.
The court of appeals in City of San Antonio v. Schneider230 held that the
dangerous layout of a road, including resurfacing efforts and the tendency of
the roadway to become slippery when wet, constituted a special defect which
imposed on the government a higher standard of care.231 Evidence
presented at trial demonstrated that traffic engineers for the City of San
Antonio were familiar with the hazards and that the complications posed by
the particular stretch of road were the proximate cause of the occurrence in
question.232 Similarly, in State Dept. of Highways & Public Transp. v.
Payne233 an obscured culvert placed near a roadway was found to be a spe-
cial defect.234 The court of appeals cited other cases which held that
ditches235 and arroyos 236 were special defects, and analogized them to the
hidden culvert in this case.237 On the other hand, an unusually high water
level and unlighted bridge did not constitute special defects according to
Tarrant County Water Control and Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Crossland.238
The court held that use of the special defects doctrine was restricted to in-
stances where construction or other obstructions had created some unusual
condition.239 In this case, no such construction or obstructions existed, and
the lake level could not be considered a special defect so as to increase the
standard of care owed by the government.24° Crossland also held that the
decision not to light a bridge or give warnings of its existence were discre-
tionary acts immunized by a special section of the Tort Claims Act.241 Like-
wise, the court in City of El Paso v. Ayoub 24 2 declined to impose liability for
the city's decision not to place or upgrade guardrails and barricades on an
overpass.243
228. Typically, a premises owner owes a licensee a duty not to injure the licensee wilfully,
wantonly or through gross negligence. Furthermore, unless the owner has knowledge of a
dangerous condition, the existence of which is unknown to a licensee, the premises owner does
not owe a duty to warn or make the condition reasonably safe. Lower Neches Valley Author-
ity v. Murphy, 536 S.W.2d 561, 562-63 (Tex. 1976); State v. Tennison, 509 S.W.2d 560, 562
(Tex. 1974).
229. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.022(b) (Vernon 1986).
230. 787 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ denied).
231. Id. at 468.
232. Id.
233. 781 S.W.2d 318 (rex. App.-Houston (1st Dist.] 1989, writ granted).
234. Id. at 322.
235. City of Houston v. Jean, 517 S.W.2d 596, 599 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [list Dist.]
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
236. Chappell v. Dwyer, 611 S.W.2d 158, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ).
237. 781 S.W.2d at 322.
238. 781 S.W.2d 427, 434 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, writ denied).
239. Id. at 433.
240. Id. at 434.
241. Id. at 433; TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.056(2) (Vernon 1986 & Supp.
1991).
242. 787 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, writ denied).
243. Id. at 554.
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In Delaney v. University of Houston244 the court of appeals held that the
University of Houston was not liable for claims based upon the rape of a
student in a dormitory.245 The court noted that the Texas Tort Claims Act
does not waive immunity for claims arising out of intentional torts.2" The
University of Houston student, however, attempted to circumvent the Texas
Tort Claims Act by arguing that running a dormitory was a proprietary
function and thus completely outside the scope of the Act. Pointing to a
wealth of out-of-state precedent, the victim argued that since the state had
undertaken a non-governmental function, it should be held liable for its neg-
ligence. The court of appeals rejected this argument, concluding that the
University of Houston is a branch of the State of Texas. 247 According to the
court, the State of Texas has no proprietary capacity and acts only in a gov-
ernmental role.248
Driskill v. State249 involved an exception to the Texas Tort Claims Act
which grants the government immunity for claims arising from the assess-
ment or collection of taxes.250 The Tort Claims Act does not allow suit for
allegations arising out of "the assessment or collection of taxes by a govern-
mental unit."251 In this case, a State Comptroller's employee was driving to
a delinquent taxpayer's place of business to discuss the payment of past-due
taxes. While in the course and scope of her employment, the state employee
collided with another motorist. Since the employee was technically engaged
in the collection of taxes, the State of Texas argued that it was immune from
suit according to the provisions of the Act. The supreme court rejected this
contention, holding that the exception under discussion granted governmen-
tal immunity only for injuries which resulted directly from the assessment or
collection of taxes.252 The court held that the automobile accident was not
directly related to the assessment of taxes and had nothing to do with the
implementation of policy decisions on how to collect or assess taxes.253 The
court also concluded that the motorist's settlement with the state employee
did not extinguish any claims against the state itself.254
B. Sovereign Immunity
Dominguez v. Kelly255 was a suit brought against an examining physician
who reported that a child had been the victim of sexual abuse. Although the
physician examined the child at the request of the State Social Services
244. 792 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ granted).
245. Id. at 738.
246. 792 S.W.2d at 735; T"x. Civ. PL4c. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.057(2) (Vernon 1986
& Supp. 1991).
247. 792 S.W.2d at 738.
248. Id.
249. 787 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. 1990).
250. Id. at 370.
251. TEx. Cv. PRAc. & RaM. CODE ANN. § 101.055 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1991).
252. Driskill, 787 S.W.2d at 370.
253. Id. at 371.
254. Id.
255. 786 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, writ denied).
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Agency, the wrongfully accused parents alleged that the doctor was negli-
gent and guilty of various intentional torts. The court of appeals held that
the doctor had no duty to the parents and further stated that a specific sec-
tion of the Family Code granted immunity to "any person reporting pursu-
ant to this chapter. '25 6
V. STATUTES OF LIMITATION AND REPOSE
In a significant departure from prior Texas case law, the supreme court in
Moreno v. Sterling Drug2 57 declared that the discovery rule does not toll the
statute of limitations in wrongful death actions. 2 8 The case came to the
supreme court via the Fifth Circuit as a certified question in two consoli-
dated cases. 259 In both cases the infants died of Reye's Syndrome, allegedly
from taking aspirin manufactured by the Sterling Drug Company. Constru-
ing the Wrongful Death Act,260 the supreme court held that regardless of
whether the parents knew or should have known of the cause of their child's
death, the parents had a maximum of two years in which to bring suit.261
The court held that the plain meaning of the Wrongful Death Act was un-
ambiguous and required an absolute statute of limitations.262 Moreover, use
of the statute to determine when a cause of action accrues supplants the use
of the discovery rule.263 The court followed what it perceived as the major-
ity of jurisdictions in declining to grant parents a reasonable opportunity to
discover the cause of their child's death.264 The majority then concluded
that the new construction of the statute did not violate the open courts pro-
vision of the Texas Constitution.265
The dissent rightfully pointed out that the opinion had once again made it
more efficient to kill someone than to injure them.266 Had the child merely
been injured, as in Nelson v. Krusen,267 the discovery rule would have pre-
served the patient's right to sue for injuries received by the child. The dis-
sent pointed out that at the time of the children's death, the critical
causation between Reye's Syndrome and the use of aspirin had not yet been
determined. 268 Furthermore, none of the outside precedent considered by
the court involved limitations provisions which were analogous to the Texas
Wrongful Death/Survival Acts. 269 The separate opinion also concluded
that the open courts provision of the constitution protected wrongful death
256. Id. at 751; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.03 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1991).
257. 787 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1990).
258. Id. at 349.
259. Id. The questions were certified under TEx. R. APp. P. 114.
260. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1991).
261. 787 S.W.2d at 354.
262. Id. at 352.
263. Id. at 353.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 357; TEx. CONST. art. I, § 13.
266. 787 S.W.2d at 358.
267. 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1984). Incidentally, the Krusen case was authored by the same
judge who wrote Moreno.




and survival action claimants and mandated the use of the discovery rule.270
The court in Twyman v. Twyman 271 held that a husband's intentional in-
fliction of mental anguish was a continuing tort which extended the statute
of limitations for claims arising out of a divorce.272 According to the court,
a continuing tort is not complete until the tortious acts have ceased.273 An-
other relatively minor exception to the statute of limitations was discussed in
Hooper v. Torres.274 The court in Hooper reversed a jury verdict in favor of
an injured automobile driver.275 Suit was filed two years and three days
after the automobile accident which injured Janie Torres. In response to a
statute of limitations defense, Torres relied upon a special provision of the
Civil Practice and Remedies Code to toll the statute of limitations during
-any period of time that a defendant was out of the state.276 The jury found
that the truck driver had, indeed, been out of the state. Evidence estab-
lished, however, that the absence was before the filing of suit as opposed to
after litigation had ensued.277 Without this evidence, the plaintiff could not
meet her burden of proof for avoiding the effective statute of limitations.278
The statute of repose was considered in Rodarte v. Carrier.279 The suit
arose out of the death of a worker repairing a heater-air conditioning unit
attached to a building. The air conditioning unit was designed, installed,
and maintained by the Carrier Corporation, but was attached to the prem-
ises more than ten years before the date of the lawsuit. The statute of repose
protects those who construct or impair an improvement to real property
such as heating and refrigeration systems.280 As such, the statute of repose
extinguished liability for any damages.281
VI. DAMAGES
A. Exemplary Damages
The court in Rainbow Express v. Unkenholz 282 addressed the type of evi-
dence constituting gross negligence. 283 In Rainbow Express a truck hauling
tractor tires to Illinois suffered a blow out of the front left tire and injured a
motorist. Testimony revealed that badly worn tires caused the blowout, and
that the tires were in violation of several Department of Transportation stan-
270. Id. at 362. Hard on the heels of Moreno is Young v. Jones Lumber Co., 784 S.W.2d
949, 950 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied), in which the court of appeals
applied the Moreno reasoning to extinguish the rights of the survivors of a lumber yard worker
to bring suit following his cancer-caused death.
271. 790 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ granted).
272. Id. at 821.
273. Id.
274. 790 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, writ denied).
275. Id. at 761.
276. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1991).
277. 790 S.W.2d at 759.
278. Id.
279. 786 S.W.2d 94 (rex. App.-E Paso 1990, no writ).
280. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.009 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1991).
281. 786 S.W.2d at 95.
282. 780 S.W.2d 427 (rex. App.-Texarkana 1989, writ denied).
283. Id. at 429.
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dards.28 4 The issue on appeal was whether sufficient evidence was presented
to indicate a conscious indifference for the rights, welfare, and safety of the
public.28 5 Upholding the jury's finding, the Texarkana court of appeals con-
cluded that the driver and his terminal manager were consciously indifferent
to the extreme dangers that the worn tires presented. 28 6 The terminal man-
ager who allowed the truck to be driven with the substandard tires was a
vice-principal of Rainbow Express. In order to impose exemplary damages
upon a corporation for the acts of its agents, there must be sufficient evi-
dence that the actor was employed in some managerial capacity or was per-
forming an act which was later authorized or ratified by the principal. 28 7
Because he had supervisory powers, the manager was determined to be a
vice-principal with the power to bind the corporation for gross negligence. 288
The issue of vice-principals was also discussed in Mercy Hospital of
Laredo v. Rios28 9 where the court upheld a jury finding that a head nurse
was vice-principal of the hospital.290 Relying upon another appellate court
decision,29' the court reasoned that a hospital is responsible for the actions
of a registered nurse in charge of a patient.292 The gross negligence of the
vice-principals could thus be imparted to the hospital. 293 In this connection,
the supreme court case of Ramos v. Frito Lay294 is instructive. As discussed
earlier,295 the case arose from the alleged intentional tort committed by a
vice-principal of a corporation. The supreme court held that the nature of
the employment, as opposed to the nature of the specific act, is determinative
of whether the actor is a vice-principal. 296 According to Ramos, a vice-prin-
cipal performing any type of act, whether or not managerial, can create lia-
bility for exemplary damages on the part of a corporation.297
B. Actual Damages
In Vaughn v. Reagan298 a father of a young girl was severely injured
through the negligence of a tavern owner. During a bar fight, William Rea-
gan was smashed in the head with a baseball bat and suffered severe brain
damage. The jury awarded damages to the daughter based upon loss of pa-
rental care, nurture and guidance. The defendants appealed on the grounds
284. 49 C.F.R. § 570.62 (1989).
285. Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 916 (Tex. 1981).
286. 780 S.W.2d at 431.
287. Id. at 432.
288. Id.
289. 776 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied).
290. Id. at 635.
291. Texarkana Memorial Hosp. v. Firth, 746 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1988, no writ).
292. 776 S.W.2d at 635.
293. Id. at 624-635.
294. 784 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990).
295. For a more complete discussion, see supra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
296. 784 S.W.2d at 669.
297. Id.
298. 784 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ granted), rev'd in part,
Reagan v. Vaughn, 34 Tex. S. Ct. J. 189 (Dec. 19, 1990).
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that a minor plaintiff in Texas in not entitled to recover for lost parental
consortium except in wrongful death cases.299 The court of appeals agreed,
holding that the decision to recognize the new cause of action was reserved
to the legislature or the supreme court.300 The court of appeals refused to
recognize this cause of action even though it was clear that the diminished
capabilities of the parent (he had the capacity of a five or six year-old) se-
verely injured his relationship with his minor child.301 The Texas Supreme
Court, in a landmark decision, reversed the court of appeals and reinstated
the jury's award of consortium damages to the daughter.30 2 The decision
represents an extension of Texas law because such damages are no longer
limited to wrongful death cases.
Several cases reported in this survey period reversed jury verdicts which
refused to award damages despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
For instance, in Gray v. Floyd 303 the court of appeals reversed a verdict
which awarded the plaintiff the amount of her full surgeon's bill but refused
to award any damages for hospital and anesthesia fees.304 Jackson v. Tay-
or30 5 reversed a federal jury's decision not to award damages for future
medical expenses, past or future pain or suffering, and past or future lost
earnings and earning capacity. 306 Faced with objective and uncontroverted
evidence concerning these damages, the court reversed and remanded for
another jury trial.3 0 7
299. Id. at 90.
300. Id. at 92.
301. Id.
302. Reagan v. Vaughn, 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 189 (Dec. 19, 1990).
303. 783 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ).
304. Id. at 217.
305. 912 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1990).
306. Id. at 797.
307. Id. at 798.

